Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are attractive targets for attackers, as they offer an avenue to attack critical infrastructure (CI) systems controlled by SCADA systems. Ultimately, an attack on any system exploits some undesired (malicious or accidental) functionality in the components of the system. Unfortunately, it is far from practical to eliminate undesired functionality in every component of a system. The contribution of this paper is a novel architecture for securing SCADA systems that guarantee that "any malicious modification of the deployment configuration or the design configuration of the SCADA system will be detected"-even if undesired functionality may exist in SCADA system components.
Trusted Computing Base
For any system with a desired set of security requirements  , the trusted computing base (TCB) is "a small amount of software and hardware we rely on" (to realize the requirements  ) and "that we distinguish from a much larger amount that can misbehave without affecting security" [14] . In other words, as long as the TCB is worthy of trust the TCB can be leveraged to realize the desired assurances  regarding the operation of the entire system.
In the proposed passive approach to secure SCADA systems, a resource limited trustworthy module-which we shall refer to as an STCB (SCADA Trusted Computing Base) module serves as the TCB for model-execution. The main contributions of this paper are: 1) a strategy for expressing of state-transition models for SCADA systems; and 2) a functional specification for STCB modules, for executing the model.
To improve the confidence in the integrity of STCB modules, they should ideally be manufactured under a well-controlled environment, and consummately tested for the designed functionality. To facilitate consummate testing, it is necessary to deliberately constrain STCB modules to possess simple functionality. For low-cost mass-realization of reliable STCB modules to be practical, the simple functions executed inside STCB modules should nevertheless permit them to serve as the TCB for any SCADA system-irrespective of the nature and scale of the CI system. While the "instruction set" for specifying the state transition model should be rich enough to be suitable for any SCADA system, it should simultaneously be simple enough to be executed even by severely resource limited STCB modules.
The main components of the proposed STCB based security architecture include 1) a systematic strategy for designing SCADA state-transition models for any SCADA system, consisting of a) an instruction set for expressing the model, b) role of the designer of the SCADA system, and c) role of the deployer of the system;
2) a functional specification for STCB modules, suitable for executing the instruction set for any SCADA system; and 3) an STCB protocol, for interacting with STCB modules, and obtaining SCADA state reports.
Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is an overview of STCB approach. Section 3 outlines the STCB design process. Section 4 outlines processes for STCB deployment and operation. Section 5 provides a detailed description of the STCB functionality. Section 6 describes the STCB protocol. Finally, conclusions are offered in Section 7.
Overview of STCB Approach
While a state-based security approach can be extended to any system, such an approach is indeed natural for critical infrastructure SCADA systems. Note that the ultimate purpose of a SCADA system, viz., to monitor and report CI system states to stake-holders, is indeed identical to that of state-model based security architecture, consisting of model-driven verification and reporting.
The state reports from a SCADA system can be seen as a function of the current states of all sensors associated with the system. For a SCADA system characterized by n sensors, let 1 n v v  represent the states of the n sensors, and let
represent a function that captures the "physics" of the controlled system, and Consequently, notwithstanding current active measures, the integrity of the state reports is far from assured. Specifically, current active approaches include features like a) cryptographic protection of links between RTUs and MTUs [15] - [20] to prevent message injection attacks by attackers and b) intrusion detection systems to facilitate early detection of attacks [21] [22] [23] to detect and evade attacks.
The goal of the STCB security model is to guarantee the integrity of state reports provided by the agent. To achieve its goals, the STCB security model relies only on a) the integrity of STCB modules, and b) the integrity of clearly defined processes to be adopted by entities identified as the designer and the deployer of the SCADA system. The designer is an entity with good domain knowledge (regarding the CI system); the deployer is a security professional who is not required to possess any knowledge of the CI system. To the extent the stake-holder trusts the integrity of the STCB modules, and the verifiable processes adopted by the designer and the deployer, the stake-holder is assured of the integrity of the state report-even if malicious functionality may exist in SCADA system components.
STCB System Components
The additional components introduced into a STCB-secured SCADA system in-  is assured by the CM.
The exact make up of the manager U is irrelevant for our purposes of guaranteeing the integrity of ( )  , as U is not trusted. Unless U performs it tasks faithfully, valid state reports cannot be sent to the stake holders.
The state reports are relayed by the STCB manager U to an STCB module r M associated with a stake-holder. Any number of stake holder modules like r M may exist. More generally, a stake-holder module may be the CM for another STCB deployment.
For example, the state reports from different SCADA systems may be provided as "sensor reports" to a system at a higher level of hierarchy. In such a scenario, the stake-holder module 2) evaluation of
 's may require evaluation of complex functions, and thus challenging to represent using merely the instruction set  . Both challenges are addressed through the use of Merkle hash trees [24] .
Merkle Trees
A Merkle tree is a binary hash tree which permits a resource limited entity to assure the integrity of a dynamic database of practically any size, even while the database is stored in an untrusted location. Specifically, the resource limited entity only needs to store a single cryptographic hash-the root of the tree. A Merkle hash tree with 2 L n = leaves (for simplicity we shall assume that is a power of (2) has L levels. For storing a database with n records, each record is interpreted as a leaf of the tree. Corresponding to each leaf (record) R is a leaf-hash obtained as ( ) h R , by hashing the leaf using a secure cryptographic hash function ( )
The n leaf-hashes (say,
at level 0 of the binary tree. At level 1 of the tree are n/2 leaf hashes
Similarly, the n/2 leaves in level 1 result in n/4 nodes in level 2, and so on. Construction of the tree stops at level L with a single node Figure 2 .
Protocols that employ Merkle hash trees can be seen as an interaction between two parties-a prover and a verifier. The prover stores all n leaves and all 2 1 n − nodes (distributed over levels 0 to L). v ).
Merkle Trees in the STCB Approach
In the STCB approach resource challenged STCB modules store only the root of the tree, and have the ability to perform
operations. This capability is leveraged to assure the integrity of 1) a dynamic database of n sensor measurements;
2) any number of simple static "algorithms" to evaluate different
where each algorithm is a small number of instructions (belonging to the instruction set  ) supported by STCB modules; and 3) static look-up tables (of any size) for evaluating complex functions that may be necessary to execute some (instruction in)
Specifically, the STCB module 0 M for an STCB deployment stores a (static) root of a static Merkle tree, and the (dynamic) root of a dynamic Merkle tree.
The leaves of the static tree are the specifications for a specific STCB deployment-provided by the designer and the deployer of the system. The leaves of the dynamic tree are the current states of the n sensors of the system. The leaves and all intermediate nodes of both trees, are stored by the untrusted STCB manager U.
STCB Designer and Deployer
One of the main motivations for clearly demarcating between the roles of a designer and a deployer is that entities with good domain knowledge (for example, an entity with in-depth knowledge about the domain of specific CI system, like a nuclear plant) are often unlikely to be security experts. Likewise, security experts are unlikely to be experts in the domain of the specific CI system.
The designer is a domain expert with good knowledge of the CI system. The designer is required to be aware of the purpose of each sensor in the system, and the interpretation of their states. For example, (say) in a water-tank control sys- The deployer is a security professional who may not possess any CI system domain knowledge. The responsibility of the deployer is to procure and install STCB modules, and be aware of steps to be taken, for example, to 1) facilitate establishment of shared secrets between modules; 2) securely connect (for example, using tamper-evident connectors) physical sensor outputs to SMs, and record such bindings (for example, ( )
,
S M
indicating that sensor 5 S is connected to module
3) deploy the STCB manager U-which includes installation of all hardware/software necessary to relay SM outputs to the STCB manager U, setting up a channel to the CM 0 M , and a channel to be used for conveying state reports to stake holders. However, U, and such channels, are not trusted.
Ultimately, the components of the system-model specified by the deployer take the form of two types of records. Records of type B (binding records) specify binding between a sensor identity i S and the module identity j M responsible for authenticating reports from i S . Records of type R (or reporting records) specify the identity of the STCB module to which a report regarding a specific system-state is to be made.
STCB Design
The designer is entrusted with the responsibility of describing function
is evaluated whenever an fresh measurement from sensor i S is available.
STCB Design Tree
The designer provides a specification of ,1
Merkle tree-the design tree-with root s ξ . The tree includes 
Each sensor is associated with a set of 
S S 
can be set to zero if less than q related sensors suffice. Finally, the value i S′ is optional, and is the identity of a "synthetic" sensor (explained later).
Example System
To describe different steps involved in the construction of a design tree we will use a simplified version of a thermal power plant with six sensors 1
6
S S  as a running example, see Figure 3 . , , 
to reflect the staleness of the w outputs.
Note that dynamic values associated with any i S may be affected not just by values corresponding to sensors directly related to i S , but also sensors indirectly related to i S -for example sensors related to a related sensor j S (once removed) or sensors related to a sensor related to j S (twice removed) and so on.
Computing the value τ as in Equation (5) ensures that the value i τ will be the least of the sensor-report time t corresponding to every sensor that is directly or 
Example i  for Power Plant
For the example system 0.0.3, let the maximum number of related sensors be 3 q = ; the number of outputs of each i  be 2 w = ; and the number of constants 8 l = . In this example, say there exists a rule that the values 1 2 , v v of sensors 1 2 , S S have to be within threshold ranges ( ) ( ) ( )
Synthetic Sensors
The sensors 1 n S S  can be of three types-real sensors, state-report sensors, and synthetic sensors.
Real sensors are physical sensors in the SCADA deployment. Specifically, during the STCB deployment phase, real sensors are bound to SMs.
State reports from a foreign STCB system are seen by the receiving CM as a 
Constants and Look-Up Tables
In general, the value i λ -which is a one way function of constants required to c C c C = =  two of the l constants will specify the range of the independent variable x, and one will specify the corresponding dependent variable y. For 2 dimensional LUTs of the form ( )
, y f x x = , four of the l constants will specify the ranges for the two independent variables, and a fifth constant will specify the corresponding value of y.
Special instructions (say LUT1 and LUT2) in the instruction set  will specify the operands-the dependent and independent variables. As one possible design of the two instructions, instruction LUT1 interprets constants 1 c and 2 c as the range of the independent variable x and constant 3 c as the corresponding dependent variable y. Before the module executes the instruction LUT1, it expects the value of the input operand to be within the range of constants 1 c Such a specification will also include a detailed listing of all permitted opcodes and their interpretation. This paper, however, is restricted to describing some of the salient features of STCB modules.
Instructions for Thermal Power Plant Example
For the example system 3. , ,
respectively, where ( )
x x represents lower and higher thresholds for sensor i S .
2) The speed of turbine should be between upper and lower limits depending on the temperature and pressure inside the turbine cell.
( )
δ is another threshold (the speed of the turbine should be a specific function of the pressure and temperature inside the turbine cell).
3) The position of the fire regulator should be between upper and lower limits depending on the current speed of turbine 6 v and the current temperature and pressure values inside the boiler cell.
( ) , , , , , , ,
2) A tree with one leaf with 8 constants , , ,0 , , ,0
where 1 2 α α  are hashes of instructions outlined in Table 1 .
STCB Deployment
The deployer of the SCADA system is trusted to verify the integrity of the physical bindings between various sensors and SMs. Specifically, the deployer is required to permanently connect the outputs of every sensor to an SM, and apply tamper-evident seals to such connections. The deployer specifies binding records of the form 
can now be seen as the root of a Merkle tree with two sub-trees-the design tree to the left, with root s ξ , and the deployment tree to the right, with root p ξ .
The static value sp ξ is the unique descriptor for a specific STCB deployment (deployed to secure a specific SCADA system), see Figure 4 . 
STCB Operation
To commence operation in a SCADA deployment, the STCB module 2) c is the clock-tick value of the module that created the report;
3) sp ξ is STCB descriptor of the creator of the report (which was the value used to initialize the module); 4) K ′ is a shared secret between the creator (SM or foreign CM) and receiv- In practice, the SMs will need to be located as close as possible to the sensors to improve the security of the binding between sensors and SMs. The CM could be housed in any location-for example, a secure location far removed even from the SCADA control center. Components of U will need to be housed close to SMs, and close to the CM.
STCB Architecture
STCB modules have a unique identity, and a unique secret issued by a trusted key distribution center (KDC 
Every module possesses three values that are affected whenever a module is ,
2) a non-volatile session counter σ , which is incremented; and 3) a random secret γ , which is spontaneously generated inside the module.
Module Registers
Non-volatile storage inside the module is used to store three values-secret Q issued by the KDC, session counter σ , and module identity M.
Every module has the following reserved volatile registers:
The self-secret γ spontaneously generated inside the module remains privy 
Initializing Peer Parameters
The pairwise secret K that a module M shares with a peer module M ′ is used for computing message authentication codes (MAC) for outgoing messages to peer M ′ , and for verifying incoming MACs from peer M ′ . Specifically, the secret used by M for computing outgoing MACs is ( ) 
Self Certificates
Two types of certificates are computed by STCB modules-binary hash tree certificates, and offset certificates.
Binary Tree Certificates
A binary hash tree certificate is computed as (to combine the first two certificates, and combine the resulting certificate with the third certificate) can be used.
Offset Certificates
An offset certificate is computed as
and states that the module M (that issued the certificate) had performed a handshake within a duration  with a module M ′ , and had estimated the offset between their clocks to be os . The certificate also states that the handshake was performed when it's session counter was σ and the session counter of M ′ was σ ′ . The offset certificate is issued by a function 
Initializing STCB Modules
Initializing an STCB module M implies initializing three internal registers re- To initialize a module as a CM for the deployment, the inputs ( ) 
Sensor and State Reports
In an STCB deployment with SMs 2) t c = is the current clock tick count of the creator of the report;
3) sp ξ is the value used to initialize the module.
A report from 
Sensor Updates and Incremental State Evaluations
it should be ensured that the current state of sensor i S is loaded onto register 4) the values 0 S ∈s (the identity of the sensor to be updated) and S ∈  r (the sensor from which a fresh report has been received) should be the same. 
STCB Protocol
The STCB protocol can be seen as the actions to be performed by the untrusted STCB manager U to submit sensor reports from SMs and CMs of foreign deployments to the CM 0 M of the STCB deployment, obtain state-reports from 0 M , and submit such reports to stake holders (or CMs of foreign deployments).
Generation of Offset Certificates
The first step in the operation of an STCB deployment is that of performing handshakes between various modules to obtain offset certificates. In general one offset certificate will be generated for every module specified in the binding records of the deployment. 
Generating Static Binary Tree Certificates
The second step is for U to obtain binary tree certificates corresponding to all leaves of the static tree with root sp ξ . Specifically, as U maintains the tree with root sp ξ , U can readily provide the complementary nodes for any leaf in the static tree to function
, and obtain certificates of the form ( )
, , , ,
where s x is the cryptographic hash of the s th leaf of the static tree. The total number of static leaves is ( ) ( ) 
Initialization and Regular Operation
The third step is the initialization of STCB modules to operate in deployment On completion of the three steps, the STCB manager maintains a dynamic Merkle tree with leaves as sensor records. As the initial values of such records are specified by the designer, the root of the tree should be the same as the initial value 0 ξ ξ = stored by the STCB module. Once all STCB modules have been initialized, sensor reports from SMs (or CMs of foreign deployments) are submitted to the CM as and when they are received. In general, not all sensors may report at the same frequency.
As all SMs send messages only to the CM, 
Conclusions
The ever growing complexity of systems poses a severe threat-the possibility of hard-to-detect hidden functionality that can be exploited to take control of the system. Current strategies for securing SCADA systems are predominantly focused on development of suitable intrusion detection systems. Such security measures ignore the very real possibility of hidden functionality in the intrusion detection systems themselves.
In the proposed approach to secure SCADA systems only STCB modules are trusted to provide the assurance that "no attack will go undetected". The proposed approach involves three stages-a design process carried out by a designer with good domain knowledge, a deployment process carried out by a security professional, and regular operation of the STCB system. The designer and deployer together specify a concise description sp ξ of the system. During regular Some of the important features of the STCB approach that make it well suited for any SCADA system of any size include 1) the ability to support hierarchical deployments;
2) the ability to support any type of function  -if necessary through the use of 1-D, or 2-D look up tables (which are also specified as leaves of the design tree); and 3) the ability to specify synthetic sensors.
Such features are intended to enable the use of STCB modules for securing any SCADA system.
The first pre-requisite for deployment of STCB based security solutions is the actual availability of STCB modules/chips. Towards this end, the work that has been performed is a small first step-identification of a functional specification of such chips. In arriving at an appropriate functional specification, some our main goals have been 1) reducing computational and memory requirement inside STCB chips;
2) reducing interface complexity (size of inputs and outputs to/from the STCB chips); and 3) simplifying the STCB protocol-which is a specification of a sequence of interactions with the STCB modules-to realize the desired assurances.
The proposed functional specification (for STCB modules) is merely a specification, and not the specification. Just as there are numerous ways to realize a block-cipher or a hash function, there are numerous ways to arrive at a "set of STCB functions" (which can be leveraged to realize the same assurances). The functional specification in this paper is however the first of its kind.
